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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues for review.
Issue #1: Whether any of the lower court's factual findings were "clearly
erroneous"?
Standard of Review: The lower court's factual findings, "whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . . " Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a). "After marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, an
appellant must demonstrate that even in the light most favorable to the trial court, the
evidence was insufficient to support the findings." Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176,
1178-79 (Utah 1989). To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal,
"an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Issue #2: Given the factual findings made by the lower court, did the lower court
err in finding that CDLF had not met its burden of establishing the existence of a separate
oral contract to convey real property by clear, convincing and definite evidence?
Standard of Review: "The applicability of the statute of frauds is a question of
law to be reviewed for correctness. However, because a trial court must consider facts
offered by the parties regarding part performance of the agreement, we follow the above289041 1

articulated standard of review for these subsidiary factual determinations and will reverse
only '"[i]f the evidence is so vague and uncertain that the finding is obviously
erroneous."5" Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 23, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Martin v. Scholl,
678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983)) (quoting Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d
18, 23, 305 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1956).).
Issue #3: Given the factual findings made by the lower court, did the lower court
err in finding that CDLF had not met its burden of establishing that its alleged part
performance was clear, definite and exclusively referable to the alleged oral contract to
convey real property?
Standard of Review: See Standard of Review for Issue #2, above.
Issue #4: Given the factual findings made by the lower court, did the lower court
err in finding that CDLF had not met its burden of establishing that it was entitled to a
preliminary injunction?
Standard of Review: "Where a court's ruling on a motion for an injunction is
based on its consideration of the evidence presented in light of relevant legal factors, the
grant or denial of injunctive relief rests within the discretion of the trial court." [Citations
omitted.] The court's construction of an applicable legal standard, however, is reviewed
for correctness; we afford no deference to the court's interpretations of law." [Citations
omitted.] Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, t 6, 991 P.2d 67.
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STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Findings by the court - Effect.
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58 A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the
court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings
of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the
findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded
in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial
court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Injunctions - Grounds.
A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a
showing by the applicant that:
(1)

The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or
injunction issues;

(2)

The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage
the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or
enjoined;

(3)

The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest; and

(4)

There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on
the merits which should be the subject of further litigation.

289041J
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents a dispute over the scope of a gift made to a charitable
organization, Appellant Centro de la Familia de Utah ("CDLF") by Appellees Dream
Chaser, L.L.C. ("Dream Chaser") and Bonita Carter, individually and in her capacity as
Trustee of The Carter Family Foundation ("Carter" or collectively "Carters"). The
Carters intended to give CDLF a lease for a two year term, with options to renew for ten
year terms, to the Honeyville Elementary School (the "Property"). This gift was based
upon written documents. CDLF claims it was entitled to receive title to the Property
based on an oral agreement.
Statement of Facts
Rule 52(a) mandates that "in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the
court shall... set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). These findings, "whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . .. ." Id. As
explained in more detail below, CDLF incorrectly asserts that it can avoid the marshaling
requirement of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) and have this Court exercise de novo review
over factual findings simply because the lower court did not hear live testimony.
Because the lower court's findings of fact are given deferential review under Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a), there is no reason to disturb them where the appellant fails to marshal
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Grayson Roper Ltd. P 'ship v. Finlinson,
782 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 1989).
289041J
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The lower court's findings are attached to Appellant Add. as Ex. L and
incorporated by Carters in their entirety.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court's decision to deny CDLF's motion for preliminary injunction,
although based solely on documentary evidence, does not merit a de novo review.
Instead, the lower court's findings of fact may be set aside only if clearly erroneous.
Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, the lower court's findings of fact are
presumed correct. In addition, because CDLF failed to fulfill its obligation to marshal the
evidence in support of the lower court's factual findings, the lower court's findings are
presumed correct.
Even if CDLF had marshaled all of the evidence supporting the lower court's
findings, the lower court's denial of preliminary injunction should not be overturned
because CDLF has failed to show that the clear weight of the evidence supports a finding
that it has met all the elements of a preliminary injunction. CDLF has failed to show that
it is likely to succeed on the merits of their underlying claim. They have not presented
evidence which clearly supports a finding of a firm commitment by the Carters to transfer
the Property to CDLF. In addition, CDLF has failed to show that the evidence supports a
finding of part performance sufficient to either avoid the statute of frauds or supply a
substitution for consideration. CDLF has also failed to adequately establish the element
of irreparable harm. The trial court's decision to deny CDLF's motion for preliminary
injunction should be affirmed.

289041 1
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ARGUMENT
I.

CDLF HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL
FINDINGS WERE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS",
CDLF asserts that it can avoid the marshaling requirement of Utah R. App. P.

24(a)(9) and asks this Court to exercise de novo review over factual findings, simply
because the lower court did not hear live testimony. Appellant's Brief at 23-24. CDLF is
incorrect on both issues.
A.

Appellate Courts Do Not Review Evidence De Novo.

Rule 52(a) mandates that "in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the
court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). These findings, "whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ." Id. Only
if a trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "'against the clear weight of
the evidence'" are they clearly erroneous. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312
(Utah 1998) (quoting In re Estate ofBartch, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).).
Where, as here, the lower court has denied a motion for preliminary injunction, to
successfully argue that the trial court erred in denying the preliminary injunction, CDLF:
[M]ust successfully challenge all of the findings regarding [its]
inability to meet the essential elements. In other words, [CDLF]
must show that the clear weight of the evidence supports a finding
that it has met all the elements of a preliminary injunction.
Utah Med Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998).

289041 1
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CDLF asserts that it can avoid the marshaling requirement, and have this Court
exercise de novo review over factual findings, simply because the lower court did not
hear live testimony.1 Appellant's Brief at 23-24.
CDLF's contention was rejected with the 1987 addition of the "oral or
documentary evidence" language to Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), adopting the 1985 amendment
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 105 F.R.D. 179, 221 (1985). The Advisory Committee Notes to
the 1985 amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) explicitly rejected the position taken by
CDLF. The same argument had been made by several courts of appeal under the
pre-1985 version of Rule 52(a). 105 F.R.D. at 221-23. They, too, had argued that when a
trial court's findings did not rest on the observation of a witness' demeanor, there was no
need to defer to the trial court's findings. Id. Rejecting this position, the Advisory
Committee stated:
The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching
appellate review of findings by the district court based solely on
documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule 52(a) does not
apply when the findings do not rest on the trial court's assessment of
credibility of the witnesses but on an evaluation of documentary
proof and the drawing of inferences from it, thus eliminating the
need for any special deference to the trial court's findings. These
considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability
and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that
the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the
facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the factfinding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the
district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by

Relying upon this assertion, CDLF fails to make even the slightest attempt to
fulfill its obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the lower court's factual
findings. Rather, CDLF presents only evidence favorable to its case, ignoring evidence
supportive of the trial court's findings.
289041 1
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encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly
reallocate judicial authority.
105 F.R.D. at 222-23.
This Court has "recognize[d] the persuasiveness of federal interpretations when
the state and federal rules are similar and few Utah cases deal with the rule in question."
Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.5 (Utah 1994). Shortly after Utah's
version of Rule 52(a) was amended to adopt the federal rule's "oral or documentary
evidence" language, this Court specifically "disavowed] language in our earlier cases
describing or implying a standard under new Rule 52(a) which differs in any significant
respect from the standard of review [set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)]."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
Just before the 1985 amendment, the United States Supreme Court had instructed
that the "clearly erroneous" standard in the federal rule required that "appellate courts
must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo."
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). The Court went on to note:
This is so even when the district court's findings do not rest on
credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.

The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not
limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make
2

The 1985 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) was published on April 29, 1985
and became effective on August 1, 1985. 105 F.R.D. at 202. Anderson v. City of
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), was decided on March 19, 1985.
289041J
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determinations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the
determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role
comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court
of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the
accuracy of fact determinations at a huge cost in diversion of judicial
resources.
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574-75. See Walker, 743 P.2d at 193 ("The appellate court...
does not consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere fact that on the same
evidence the appellate court might have reached a different result does not justify it in
setting the findings aside.'") (quoting 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971) (citations omitted)).
B.

CDLF Is Not Excused From Marshaling Evidence in Support of the
Lower Court's Findings,

Relying upon the fact that the lower court did not hear live testimony, CDLF fails
to make even the slightest attempt to fulfill its obligation to marshal the evidence in
support of the lower court's factual findings.3 Rather, CDLF presents only evidence
favorable to its case, ignoring evidence supportive of the trial court's findings.

3

In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), it was noted:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon
the evidence is clearly erroneous.

289041 1
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Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[a] party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah case law echoes this prerequisite:
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal,
"an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight
of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 232 (quoting Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312) (quoting In re
Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)) (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
"After marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, an appellant must
demonstrate that even in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence was
insufficient to support the findings." Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 232 (citing Reid v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)).
CDLF's failure to marshal the evidence alone warrants affirmance of the lower
court's decision because of the presumption of correctness that the findings are accorded
under Rule 52(a). Utah Med. Prods., 958 P.2d at 232 ("If the challenger fails to meet this
burden, its claim must fail."). See also Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467, 471 (Utah 1989) (holding that because a trial court's findings of fact are given such
deferential review under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) there is no reason to disturb them where
the appellant fails to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings); Doelle v.
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989) (same).
Because of CDLF's failure to marshal any evidence in support of the lower court's
factual findings, this Court should affirm the lower court's decision. The record
289041J
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adequately supports the findings of the lower court. The application of the lower court's
conclusions of law to the facts as determined by the court were not addressed by CDLF in
its Appellant's Brief and, thus, are not properly challenged here.
C.

The Lower Court's Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous,

Even if CDLF had marshaled all the evidence supporting the lower court's
findings, it could not have demonstrated that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support the findings. A trial court's factual findings are considered "clearly erroneous"
only when they are against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle, 784 P.2d at 1178
(citing Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989)). "In sum, we
will not overturn a trial court's factual findings if its 'account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety.'" Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d
932, 937 (Utah 1998) (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574).
Each of the lower court's findings was supported by a citation to the documentary
evidence upon which it was based. (R. 592-600.) CDLF was given an opportunity, and
did file objections to the proposed findings. See PL's Objections to Def.s' Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 554-63.) Defendants Carter, the
Foundation and Dream Chaser responded to CDLF's Objections, (R. 564-71), and
submitted a modified set of findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 572-88) which the
lower court adopted. (R. 589-90; 591-608.)

289041 1
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CDLF's failure to marshal evidence saves it the embarrassment of having to
undermine one of its key factual and legal assertions4 with the affidavit of its own Chief
Executive Officer, Graciela Italiano-Thomas. In her first affidavit, Ms. Thomas stated
that "but for Ms. Carter's promise to convey the Property to CDLF, CDLF probably
would not have located a Head Start Program [at the Honeyville School] because the Box
Elder School District was unwilling to give it to CDLF, and it was unlikely we would
be able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property." March 6, 2003
Affidavit of Graciela Italiano-Thomas ^ 5 (emphasis added). (R. 126.) Three weeks
later, in a second affidavit,5 Ms. Thomas contradicted this testimony and asserted that
"CDLF determined that in the event the School District Board was not prepared to give
the Property to CDLF, then CDLF would attempt to purchase it for a suitable price using
a portion of the $600,000 it had on hand . . . . " March 27, 2003 Affidavit of Graciela
Italiano-Thomas % 3. (R. 467.)

CDLF relies exclusively upon Ms. Thomas' second Affidavit, asserting that its
consideration for the alleged oral agreement to convey title was its forbearance from
attempting to purchase the Property with the money it allegedly had on hand, in reliance
upon Ms. Carter's alleged promise. Appellant's Brief at 6 flf 5), 8flflf11 and 13), 36, 38
and 40.
5

Although CDLF complains about the lack of discovery as part of some
underhanded scheme by the Carters to prejudice CDLF, Appellant's Brief at 18 n.2, the
lack of discovery has, obviously, effected both parties. See Hearing Transcript at 14-15
(Appellant App. Ex. J). It was the defendants who were prejudiced by the late filing of
CDLF's second set of affidavits - receiving them after business hours on the Friday
before the hearing on Monday, March 31, 2003, leaving no opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits or present contrary documentary evidence. Id.
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The lower court expressly rejected the later inconsistent statement, concluding that
"CDLF's own testimony brings into question whether there was any forbearance in June
2000 based on CDLF's assertion it withdrew from attempting to locate some other
property, or to purchase the Property using money it allegedly had on hand."
Conclusions of Law 121. (R. 606.) See also Findings of Fact 1f 8 (R. 593).6
CDLF cannot rely on an inconsistency it created in its own affidavits to argue that
the lower court's finding was "clearly erroneous." Cf. Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med.
Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998) ('"when a party takes a clear position in a
deposition,... he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which
contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation for the discrepancy.'")
(quoting Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)).
D.

CDLF Is Precluded From Complaining About the Lower Court's
Refusal to Hear Live Testimony,

Even though a trial court does not need to hold an evidentiary hearing and observe
a witness' demeanor in order to receive the deference afforded by Rule 52(a), see

CDLF did not object to paragraph 8 of the lower court's findings. Rather, it
argued that the factual statement was "incomplete" because it did not include the
contradictory statements in Ms. Thomas' second affidavit. (R. 555.) In addition, CDLF
did not object to the legal conclusion of the lower court based upon that finding.
(R. 559.) The court's finding was also supported by other evidence. Although a third
party developer had made an offer to buy the Property in May 2000, Affidavit of Ronald
L. Frandsen f 5 (R. 363), the School Board never received any inquiry or offer from
CDLF concerning the purchase of the Property. Frandsen Aff. 115 (R. 365-66); Findings
of Fact \ 9 (R. 593). In addition, Ms. Carter testified that Ms. Thomas never said
anything to her which suggested that CDLF was going to withdraw from any attempt to
independently acquire the Property in reliance upon Ms. Carter's statements. Affidavit of
Bonita K. Carter f 9. (R. 282.)

289041 i
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Section A, above, CDLF complains that the absence of live testimony relieves it of its
obligation to marshal evidence, Appellant's Brief at 23-24, and that it was prejudiced by
the lower court's "refusal to hear live testimony" before denying the motion for
preliminary injunction. Id. at 18 n.2.
At the hearing on its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, CDLF never requested
that the lower court either hear live testimony or allow it to proffer testimony on its
witnesses' behalf, See Hearing Transcript (Appellant App. Ex. J). There was no request
for the court to refuse. Id. "One who fails to make a necessary objection . . . is deemed
to have waived the issue." Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 932 (Utah
1993) (citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988)). CDLF should therefore
be precluded from complaining that the lower court refused to hear live testimony.
CDLF cannot raise its argument that the lower court refused and/or failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing for the first time on appeal. At the preliminary injunction
hearing CDLF never raised any issue concerning the failure to hear live testimony. See
Hearing Transcript (Appellant App. Ex. J). Although it filed objections to the proposed
findings, CDLF did not raise the issue of the failure of the court to hear live testimony.
See PL's Objections to Def.s' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
(R. 554-63.)
This Court has consistently refused to consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal. See, e.g., Espinalv. Salt Lake City Bd ofEduc., 797 P.2d412, 413 (Utah 1990).
As explained in Olson v. Parh-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991):
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"[t]he burden is on the parties to make certain that the record they
compile will adequately preserve their arguments for review
"
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
1983). The role of the appellate court is to sift the parties'
arguments in light of "the facts found by the trial court and square
them with the law." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,1299 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). [The appellate court may], however, weigh only those
facts and legal arguments preserved for [them] in the trial court
record. Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 135859 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
<9ta,815P.2datl359.
Nowhere in the record is there reflected a request by CDLF that the lower court
either hear live testimony or allow them to proffer testimony on behalf of its witnesses.
See Appellant App. Ex. J. Also nowhere in the record is there an objection by CDLF to
the lower court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.; PL's Objections to Def.s'
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 554-63.) CDLF's
argument that the court erred in denying their motion for preliminary injunction without
holding an evidentiary hearing therefore cannot be considered by this Court.
II.

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT CDLF COULD NOT
SATISFY THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE GRANTING OF A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
Because injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy," it "should not be lightly

granted." System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). CDLF has the
burden to establish that it has satisfied all four of the required elements. Water & Energy
Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16,1f 7, 974 P.2d 821. Here, CDLF's right to relief is
not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to warrant this Court granting the requested
preliminary injunction.

289041 1

15

CDLF acknowledges its obligation to make a prima facie showing of the elements
of its underlying claim for breach of an oral contract. CDLF sets forth the correct legal
standard: "[T]he terms of the oral contract [to convey title of land] must be clear and
definite and established by clear and definite testimony." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649
P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982) (citing Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah
1975)). Appellant's Brief at 30.
A.

There Is Not Clear and Definite Testimony of an Agreement by
Carters to Convey Title to the Property,

The facts as determined by the lower court demonstrate that the Carters never
expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged oral contract to convey title to the
Property to CDLF. At best, CDLF has presented evidence that there was nothing more
than an unenforceable agreement to agree.
In early June 2000, shortly after Ms. Carter learned that the Honeyville School
was scheduled to be closed and the building sold, and that CDLF was interested in using
the Property to house its Migrant Head Start program in Box Elder County, she met with
Ms. Thomas. Finding of Factfflf11-12. (R. 593-94.) During the meeting they discussed
an outright donation of title to the Property to CDLF, among other possibilities. Finding
of Fact If 13. (R. 594.) While CDLF and its witnesses try to make Ms. Carters'
statements sound like a firm commitment, Appellant's Statement of Facts fflj 8-10,
Appellant's Brief at 7, it was easy for the lower court to see that they were not.
First, Ms. Thomas' testimony of the first meeting between CDLF and Ms. Carter
confirms that all that was "offered" by Ms. Carter was to meet again. Second Thomas
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Affidavit 1 7 ("I enthusiastically accepted Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again

")

(R. 468.) See Appellant's Statement of Facts If 11, Appellant's Brief at 8 ("Ms. Thomas
enthusiastically accepted Mrs. Carter's offer to meet again to finalize plans to convey the
Property.").
That only a limited offer to meet again resulted from this first meeting was
recognized in the contemporaneous letter Ms. Thomas sent to Ms. Carter following the
meeting. It contained no reference to any promise by Ms. Carter to give the Property
(which neither Ms. Carter nor Dream Chaser owned at the time) to CDLF. Nor did
the letter reflect that a firm commitment had been made during the meeting by Ms. Carter
to make an outright donation of title to the Property. The letter merely referred to an
undefined "generous proposal" and acknowledged that there were "many details to work
out." Appellant App. Ex. A (emphasis added). The lower court noted that "[rjather than
a statement that CDLF and Bonnie Carter had entered into binding agreement, Ms.
Italiano-Thomas states: T earnestly hope this donation can go forward.'" Finding of
Fact 114, quoting Appellant App. Ex. A. (R. 594.)
At this point in time, there was no definitive agreement because the parties
intended to meet again to work out the details and finalize their plans to convey the
Property. In Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000),
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under even more compelling facts,7 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Utah
law, determined that:
If the parties intend to negotiate further the terms of an agreement, a
manifestation of willingness to enter into the agreement is only
preliminary, and does not demonstrate the existence of a binding
contract.
224 F.3d at 1200 (citation omitted). As in Homestead Golf Club, "[a]ll that the parties
consummated . . . was an agreement to agree, which is 'unenforceable . . . . ' " 224 F.3d
at 1201 (quoting Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979)).
It is in this context, based upon what Ms. Thomas herself characterized as a mere
"hope," that CDLF now asserts that it withdrew from any attempt to independently
acquire the Property. Appellant's Statement of Facts f 13, Appellant's Brief at 8.
Considered in context, even if viewed as an act of detrimental reliance, the lower court's
conclusion that the reliance was not reasonable is supported by the facts. See Conclusion
of Law 120. (R. 605-06.) See also Crismon v. Western Co. ofN. Am., 742 P.2d 1219,
1223 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (upholding implicit finding it was not reasonable to rely on a

In Homestead Golf Club, following the parties reaching their oral agreement and
pending written documentation of the agreement, the party which sought to enforce the
oral agreement signed a letter of commitment. 224 F.3d at 1198. In addition, written
drafts of the final agreement and related documents were prepared and presented to that
party, but not signed. Id. Finally, the party which sought to enforce the oral agreement
relied on the fact that it had fully performed - allowing the golf course to be built on its
land. Id. at 1202.
8

There are serious doubts as to whether CDLF could have independently acquired
the Property. Ms. Thomas stated in her first affidavit that "it was unlikely we would be
able to obtain separate funding to purchase the Property." First Thomas Aff. \ 5.
(R. 126.) See Findings of Fact Tf 8. (R. 593.)
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letter as a binding agreement; appellate court will defer to trial court's finding unless
clearly erroneous or have no support).
The next event which CDLF relies upon in support of the so-called oral
agreement, occurred in July 2000. The Carters submitted an offer to the School District
to buy the Property for $30,000, with the closing date set in early August 2000. Finding
of Fact <| 16. (R. 595.) According to CDLF's affidavits, before this offer was rejected by
the School District, the Carters met with representatives of CDLF. Again, CDLF claims
there were statements made concerning the Carters' intent. Appellant's Statement of
Facts f 14, Appellant's Brief at 8-9. However, these statements were, according to
CDLF's own testimony, made on the assumption that the Carters would only have to pay
$30,000 for the Property. Second Thomas Affidavit ^[ 9. (R. 468.) The $30,000 offer
was rejected by the School District. Finding of Fact f 18. (R. 595.)
By the time the School District and the Carters agreed to the terms of a purchase
of the Property in September 2000, several things had changed. The price of the Property
had more than doubled - to $72,500. Finding of Factfflj20-21. (R. 595.) The School
District and Carters had agreed the sale would be to Dream Chaser, an entity formed by
the Carters specifically to own and manage the Property. (Id.) The School District was
unable to provide marketable title to the South Parcel of the Property which was used, as
a septic system drainage field. Finding of Fact *§ 19. (R. 595.)
Significantly, by the time of the September 28, 2000 closing, the Carters decided
that they would only lease the Property to CDLF rent free for a two year period. Finding
of Fact f 23. (R. 596.) While CDLF assigns an alternative motive to the Carters for the
289041J
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two year lease,9 there is no dispute that CDLF was advised of this change prior to the
closing. Appellant's Statement of Facts«[[ 19, Appellant's Brief at 11. In addition, there
is no dispute that CDLF agreed to and executed the Lease Agreement in December 2000.
Finding of Fact f 30 (R. 597); Appellant's Brief at 34. This was done after several drafts
of the Lease were exchanged between counsel for CDLF and counsel for Dream Chaser.
Finding of Fact If 27 (R. 597); Appellant's Statement of Facts 1f 25, Appellant's Brief
at 13.
There is also no dispute10 that CDLF's counsel proposed that the lease be
simultaneously executed with a pledge of the Property to CDLF. Finding of Fact 128.
(R. 597.) This request for a pledge would have assured that title to the Property be
conveyed to CDLF at some point in the future. The request was rejected by the Carters'
counsel. Finding of Fact f 29. (R. 597.) This is further evidence supporting the lower

CDLF asserts that the Lease Agreement was to cover the time until the
improvements were completed so that the Carters could claim a tax deduction for the
value of the Property after the improvements were made by CDLF - in essence
misrepresenting the financial source of the improvements to the Internal Revenue
Service. Appellant's Statement of Facts f 14, Appellant's Brief at 8-9. Needless to say,
the Carters did not in fact perpetrate this fraud on the government (and claim they never
intended to). Before the end of December 2000, the Carters transferred their interest in
Dream Chaser to the Foundation, a non-profit corporation formed by the Carters. It was
the transfer of this interest for which the Carters took a charitable deduction on their
federal tax returns, not any transfer of any interest in the Property to CDLF or after
improvements had been made. Finding of Fact f 31. (R. 597-98.)
10

CDLF's counsel, Mr. Scott W. Hansen, was aware of the Carters' factual assertion
concerning the request for a pledge of the title when he submitted his second affidavit,
see March 28, 2003 Affidavit of Scott W. Hansen \ 5 (R. 440-41), and never denied its
truth. Id. (R. 439-443.)
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court's conclusion that the Carters did not intend to convey title, once they had in fact
obtained it.
CDLF next relies upon vague statements purportedly made to a couple of
newspapers by the Carters around the time of closing as the basis for an oral agreement to
convey title to real property.11 Appellant's Statement of Facts f 18, Appellant's Brief
at 11. See also Appellant's Brief at 32, 33, 42 and 43. The newspaper articles are
inconclusive - and certainly not the "clear and definite testimony" CDLF acknowledges
it needs to present. Appellant's Brief at 30. The September 30, 2000 Standard Examiner
article, for example, quotes Ms. Thomas as acknowledging that no binding commitment
had yet been made: "We are very appreciative that they are considering us for the
gift . . . . " Appellant App. Ex. C (emphasis added). The newspaper articles also reflect
the absence of a firm commitment by the Carters to transfer the Property and suggests the
existence of what was even then a mere promise of future performance. Id. ("still
working out" details); Appellant App. Ex. D ("plan on turning the property over")
(emphasis added).
The minutes of the September 27, 2000 School District Board meeting upon which
CDLF also relies, Appellant's Statement of Facts f 17, Appellant's Brief at 10 and at 4243, merely state that the Carters intended to "gift the property . . . to [CDLF] for use in

Relying on documents such as newspaper articles is problematic for CDLF. The
Standard Examiner article can also be read as establishing that CDLF's purported
consideration was lacking. Rather than mentioning an exchanged consideration to invest
over $600,000 in the Property, the article states: "No major changes are planned for the
building . . . . " Appellant App. Ex. C.
289041 1
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their program." Appellant App. Ex. B (emphasis added). This fact does not further
CDLF's claim. The long-term lease commitment set forth in the March 23, 2001 letter,
Appellant App. Ex. I, certainly qualifies as a gift of the "use" of the Property for CDLF's
program.
In any event, none of these "memorializations" relied upon by CDLF satisfy the
statute of frauds. They were not subscribed to by the Carters, Dream Chaser or the
Foundation, or an agent of those parties.12 See Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291,495
P.2d 814 (Utah 1972) (holding that meeting minutes did not satisfy the statute of frauds
because there was nothing to indicate that they had been subscribed to by the party by
whom the sale was to be made).
CDLF's version of the "objective" facts do not reflect "the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding
that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 24 (1981 ed.). (Relied upon at appellant's brief at 32.) The evidence more
than adequately supports the lower court's conclusion that "[n]one of the statements of
intent to convey the Property made by the Carters to representatives of CDLF occurred
after the Carters, through Dream Chaser, had obtained title to the Property." Findings of
Fact 125. (R. 596.) This finding, and the others made by the lower court, support its
legal conclusion that the Carters never "expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the

Similarly, the 2000 Annual Report was prepared by CDLF and cannot support a
finding that the Carters are bound to an oral agreement to convey title to the Property.
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alleged oral contract to convey title to the Property to CDLF." Conclusion of Law ^f 5.
(R.601.)
B.

CDLF Cannot Show Substantial Part Performance Exclusively
Referable to the Alleged Oral Agreement,

CDLF relies upon part performance of the alleged oral agreement for the Carters
to convey title both to satisfy the requirement of consideration necessary to support the
formation of a contract, and to avoid the statute of frauds. The evidence of part
performance presented here is insufficient for both.
There is no doubt that "[i]n a contract action in this state, consideration or a legally
sufficient substitute for consideration must be established as part of plaintiff s prima facie
case." Dementas v. Estate ofTallas, 164 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations
omitted). Further, "the burden of proving consideration is on the party seeking to recover
on the contract." Id. at 631 (citing Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39, 40 (Wyo. 1983).
CDLF first relies upon its rejected contention that in June 2000 it changed its
position by withdrawing from attempting to purchase the Property. The factual basis for
this alleged act of forbearance simply does not exist. The lower court's finding that
"CDLF's own testimony brings into question whether there was any forbearance in June
2000 based on CDLF's assertion it withdrew from attempting to locate some other

The Appellants incorrectly state that "Carters do not dispute that CDLF satisfies
three of the four elements of the part performance exception (i.e.9 the improvements made
on the property were substantial and valuable; valuable consideration was given; and
possession was actual and open)." Appellant's Brief at 2. Later in their brief, CDLF
acknowledges that the Carters did challenge whether valuable consideration was given.
M a t 36.
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property, or to purchase the Property using money it allegedly had on hand", Conclusions
of Law Tf 21 (R. 606), see also Findings of Fact f 8 (R. 593), is sufficiently supported by
the record to avoid being overturned by this Court.
CDLF next relies upon the retention of and payment to its architect. These acts
cannot constitute adequate part performance for several reasons. First, the Carters were
not aware of the retention of the architects or their payment. Thus, the Carters had no
way to know prior to March 23, 2001 that CDLF was supposedly relying on any putative
promise they had made.
Second, the payment to the architects was not significant enough to support
consideration for the oral contract CDLF contends was created. As CDLF acknowledges,
in order for part performance to be used, the performance relied upon must be
"substantial and valuable." Appellant's Brief at 39. CDLF tries to gloss over this
requirement by repeatedly pointing to the total amount it spent to improve the Property.
Id. However, the facts as determined by the lower court clearly reflect that all but
$13,320 for architectural services was spent after the March 23, 2001 letter was sent.
Findings of Fact ^ 37-39. (R. 599.) The payment to the architect was less than two
percent (2%) of the total amount CDLF claims it spent on the Property. This is legally
insufficient. Cf. Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(contractor failed to establish it "substantially performed" under a contract where 10% of
the work completed during a three-month period).
Thus, the lower court properly concluded that "[t]he renovation of the Property,
then, can easily be viewed as evidencing CDLF's intention to be subject to the offered
289041J
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long-term lease." Conclusions of Law % 12. (R. 603.) See Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City, 27 'Utah 2d 188, 193, 493 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1972) (remaining silent in full
awareness of other parties reliance upon oral modification constitutes acceptance of the
modified terms). This is especially true where, as here, CDLF contends that after
receiving the March 23, 2001 letter, "Ms. Thomas made a point of telephoning Mrs.
Carter about every four to six weeks. These regular contacts continued until the Spring
of 2002. During this period, Ms. Thomas kept Mrs. Carter informed of the progress of
the improvements." Appellant's Statement of Facts TJ 31, Appellant's Brief at 15.
However, she never told Ms. Carter that she had consulted with her counsel and
determined that CDLF did not accept the terms of the March 23, 2001 letter and intended
to hold the Carters to their promise to convey the Property to CDLF. Appellant's
Statement of Facts 135, Appellant's Brief at 17. It is Ms. Thomas' silence, not Ms.
Carter's, which is inexplicable under the circumstances.
Finally, the retention and payment of the architect were merely preparatory acts to
the performance of the alleged contract; not actual performance of the agreement.
"Acts merely ancillary to an oral agreement for the sale of lands,
although attended with expense, are not considered acts of part
performance sufficient to relieve the case from the provisions of the
statute of frauds."
Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 294, 293-94, 495 P.2d 817 (1972) (quoting DeMarco v.
Estlow, 18 N.J. Super. 30, 86 A.2d 446, 447-448 (1952)).
CDLF acknowledges that the acts of performance upon which it relies must be
exclusively referable to the contract. Appellant's Brief at 39'. Implicitly, CDLF
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recognizes that the evidentiary burden for this showing is on CDLF. The parol evidence
concerning the Lease Agreement relied upon by CDLF does not meet this burden. In
light of CDLF's silence following its receipt of the March 23, 2001 letter, the lower
court's determination that the subsequent expenditures could be viewed as evidencing
CDLF's intention to be subject to the offered long-term lease are adequately supported by
the record. Conclusions of Law f 12. (R. 603.)
CDLF also acknowledges that the improvements to the Property were necessary to
bring it into compliance with Head Start Program guidelines. Appellant's Brief at 2,
39-40 and 47; Appellants Statement of Factsfflf10, 27, Id. at 7 and 14. This fact supports
the lower court's conclusion that the improvements made by CDLF were covered by the
Lease Agreement, which allowed CDLF "at its own cost and expense" to "make such
alteration in the building as [CDLF] may require for the conduct of its business." Lease
Agreement f 6, Appellant App. Ex. F.14 Conclusions of Law ^f 13. (R. 603.)
C.

CDLF's Claim of Irreparable Harm Has Not Been Adequately
Established.

CDLF does not contend that the lower court's legal conclusion that speculative
assertions of harm are inadequate under the first of the four elements required for a
preliminary injunction to issue under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e). Conclusion
of Law f 23. (R. 606.) Rather, CDLF contends that in the event its Honeyville facility is

The Lease Agreement attached as Appellant's App. Ex. F. is missing its page 3 in
the copy served on counsel for the Carters, as were other copies in the record. For the
convenience of the Court, a complete copy of the Lease Agreement can be found
attached, in the Appellees' Addendum.
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closed, CDLF will be unable to administer the Head Start Program that currently serves
17215 children and some 100 migrant families. Appellant's Brief at 26.16
CDLF undercuts its own position with respect to the presence of irreparable harm,
or the lack thereof, with the new evidence it presents in its Appellant's Brief. Since the
lower court ruled, CDLF closed another Migrant Head Start facility, this one in Garland,
Utah,17 and successfully relocated 62 children. Appellant's Brief at 20-21 n.4. In
addition, CDLF has presented this Court with facts which show it is able to open a new
facility in order to accommodate its displaced clients. Id.
In addition to supporting the lower court's finding that CDLF's "harm" was
speculative, the fact that CDLF closed another facility and increased the number of
children and migrant families dependent upon its program at the Honeyville site is a self-

This figure is based on evidence arising after the lower court issued its ruling and
presented for the first time in CDLF Appellant's Brief. Appellant's Brief at 20-21 n.3
and 4.
CDLF also asserts that the families which it would not be able to serve could not
obtain comparable child care anywhere else in Utah or Southern Idaho. Appellant's Brief
at 26 Obviously, this is not a harm to CDLF, but to the families which might be affected.
CDLF also claims it might "lose credibility with its clients, and in the community" and
"will also be unable to preserve the substantial improvements it has made to the
Property." Id. at 26-27. Contrary to CDLF's assertions, both of these types of harm
could be compensated in money damages.
The lower court relied upon the fact that CDLF had closed its Migrant Head Start
center in Provo, Utah and was able to relocate its clients. The Garland center was one of
only two facilities serving Northern Utah and Southern Idaho at the time the Motion was
denied. Ruby Anderson Affidavit % 5. (R. 156.) CDLF's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction was denied in an April 2, 2003 Minute Entry ruling. (R. 550-51.) CDLF
states that the Garland facility was closed on July 31, 2003.
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inflicted harm which courts do not deem to be irreparable. See Salt Lake Tribune
Publishing Co. v. AT&T Corp., 320 F.3d 1081, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003).
D.

Harm to Carters,

Contrary to CDLF's assertion, the Carters have and will suffer harm if a
preliminary injunction is granted. The Carters have already incurred costs and attorneys'
fees trying to maintain the structure and limitations placed on what was intended as a
gratuitous gift to CDLF. In addition, Dream Chaser is entitled to holdover rent and will,
therefore, be damaged as the result of any wrongful order or injunction. Finally, Dream
Chaser, not CDLF, has paid all of the property taxes on the Property.

Affidavit of

Bonita K. Carter f 36. (R. 286.)
For these reasons, Carters requested in the lower court that in the event CDLF's
motion were granted, CDLF should be required to post a bond of at least $50,000.00.
Memorandum in Opposition at 9. (R. 200.)
CONCLUSION
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the findings of the lower court
"whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous . . . . " They "clearly erroneous" only if a trial court's findings lack any support
so as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. The lower court's factual findings
are adequately supported by the record of this case.

18

In addition, in January 2001, the Carters donated $3,000 to CDLF to help CDLF
pay the utilities at the Honeyville Property. Affidavit of Bonita K. Carter \ 35 (R. 286)
and Ex. 3. (R. 306-07.)
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CDLF's failure to marshal the evidence also warrants affirmance of the lower
court's decision because the findings are presumed correct. In any event, each of the
lower court's findings was adequately supported. CDLF cannot meet its burden to show
that the clear weight of the evidence supports a finding that it has met all the elements of
a preliminary injunction.
The facts as determined by the lower court demonstrate that the Carters never
expressed a sufficient intent to be bound by the alleged oral contract to convey title to the
Property to CDLF. At best, CDLF has presented evidence that there was nothing more
than an unenforceable agreement to agree. None of these "memorializations" relied upon
by CDLF satisfy the statute of frauds.
The evidence of part performance presented here is insufficient to satisfy the
requirement of consideration needed to find the formation of a contract, and to avoid the
statute of frauds. The acts of performance are not exclusively referable to the Lease
Agreement.
DATED thi

day of September, 2003.

Kevin N. Andersor
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of September, 2003,1 caused to be filed the
original of the foregoing and nine copies with the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court:
Utah Supreme Court
Office of the Clerk of the Court
450 South State, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and to be served via hand-delivery, two true and correct copies of the foregoing, to:
David J. Burns, Esq.
Scott W. Hansen, Esq.
BUCKLAND ORTON, L.L.C.
1000 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
CENTRO DE LA FAMILIA DE UTAH, a
Utah non-profit corporation,

Appeal No. 20030441-SC

vs.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
BONITA CARTER, individually and in her
capacity as Trustee of THE CARTER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, a Utah nonprofit corporation, and DREAM CHASER,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPELLEES' ADDENDUM

Appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick, Refusing to Grant Injunctive Relief
David J. Burns
Scott W. Hansen
BUCKLAND ORTON, L.L.C.
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 801
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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Kevin N. Anderson, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
a Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210
Attorneys for Appellees
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LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (the "Lease") is effective this ) > ^ day of
October, 2000 (the "Effective Date"), between Dream Chaser, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company ("Landlord"), and Centro de la Familia de Utah, a Utah non-profit corporation
("Tenant").
WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the covenant to maintain the property which is the subject of
this Lease, to pay taxes and insurance and of the mutual covenants and agreements of the parties
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows:
1.

Leased Premises. Landlord has and does hereby lease to Tenant, the

premises described on Exhibit "A", including all appurtenances and improvements located
thereon, and all of Landlord's rights, if any, in and to the premises described on Exhibit "B" with
each of said premises being located in Honeyville, Utah (collectively the "Premises") for the
term and upon the rental, conditions and covenants as the parties herein set forth. Said Premises
includes improvements thereto.
2.

Term. The term of this Lease shall be two years and shall commence on

the Effective Date and, unless terminated or extended, shall end on the \^

day of October,

2002.
3.

Rent. As a charitable contribution by the Landlord, Tenant is not required

to pay any ($0) rent directly to Landlord. Provided, in the event Tenant holds-over after the
term of this Lease, or after Landlord validly terminates this lease early, as a result of Tenant's
1

breach, then Tenant shall pay to Landlord for such hold-over period at the rate of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00) per month.
4.

Authorized Uses. Tenant shall use the Premises only for lawful purposes.

Such use shall be subject to restrictions of all applicable state and federal laws, restrictions and
statutes, as well as local zoning ordinances.
5.

Prohibited Uses. Tenant will not keep, use or sell, or allow to be kept,

used, sold, deposited or stored in or on the Premises, any article or material which is prohibited
by law, or which would render any fire or other hazard insurance policies in force with respect to
the Premises void or voidable. Landlord shall have 60 days after the date hereof to remove any
such prohibited material that are present as of the date hereof.
Tenant shall not use the Premises in any manner that will constitute waste,
nuisance or unreasonable annoyance (including without limitation, the use of loudspeakers or
sound or light apparatus that can be heard or seen outside the Premises) to occupants of adjacent
properties.
Tenant shall not do anything on the Premises that will cause damage to the
Premises, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
6.

Repair and Care of Building bv Tenant. Tenant has inspected the

Premises and accepts the Premises AS IS and in the condition it is in at the time of the
commencement of the term of this Lease. Tenant specifically takes subject to the current sewer
which may become unusable because of potential loss of use of a portion of the Premises. Tenant
will not commit any waste of the Premise, nor shall it use or permit the use of the Premise in
violation of any present or future law of the United States or of the State of Utah, or in violation
2

of any municipal ordinance or regulation applicable thereto. Tenant may at its own cost and
expense? and in a good and workmanlike manner, make such alterations in the building as Tenant
may require for the conduct of its business without, however, materially altering the basic
character of the building or improvements or weakening any structure on the Premises. Tenant
agrees to keep the interior of the building and the improvements on the Premises, including those
outside the building and the parking lot and grounds and yard surfacing in good condition and
repair, including repairs to the electrical wiring, heating, air conditioning, plumbing systems, and
parking paving and to clean and paint the interior of the Premises as the same may or might be
necessary in order to maintain said Premises in a clean, attractive ,and sanitary condition. Tenant
shall keep any walkways, parking area and driveways reasonably free from ice and snow. Any
alterations or improvements to the Premises shall become the property of the Landlord at the
expiration or sooner termination of this Lease, except as herein otherwise provided.
Tenant may use any licensed, reputable contractor in the remodeling, repair or
maintenance of the Premises or the building thereon, with the expense of such contractor's work
to be paid by Tenant. Additionally, in the event of an emergency, Tenant may employ the
services of any reputable contractor to perform emergency corrective actions.
Tenant agrees to maintain the roof of the building and the building's structure in
good condition and repair.
7.

Erection and Removal of Signs. During the term of the lease, Tenant may

replace or add signage to the Premises for the purpose of indicating the nature of the business
carried on by the Tenant on said Premises; provided, however, that such additional signage shall
be in conformity with all laws and ordinances in the district where the Premises are located.
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Damage to the Premises caused by the installation or removal of such signs shall be repaired and
paid for by Tenant.
8.

Glass. Tenant agrees to replace all glass broken or damaged during the

term of this Lease, with glass of the same quality as that broken or damaged.
9.

Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges for water, heat, gas,

sewer, electricity, telephone and all other utilities or services used on the Premises, including
deposits.
10.

Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. Tenant shall use its best efforts

to obtain an exception from the payment of property taxes based upon Tenant's charitable use of
the property. To the extent Tenant is unsuccessful in obtain such exemption, Tenant shall timely
pay the general real property taxes, as well as all other taxes, license fees and charges incidental
to the conduct of Tenant's business on the Premises during the term of this Lease, including
taxes on Tenant's personal property situated on the Premises; provided, however, that Tenant
may contest or dispute any such tax, or the amount thereof, upon providing sufficient surety for
the payment thereof. Landlord shall timely provide Tenant with all notices of the general real
property tax on the Premises. Upon request by Landlord, Tenant shall give Landlord proof of
exemption or of payment of such taxes prior to the due date for payment. Taxes for the first
calendar year of the term of this Lease shall be prorated between the parties as of the date Tenant
obtains possession of the Premises and taxes for the last year shall be prorated to and including
the date Tenant quits possession of the Premises. Tenant shall pay all assessments (building
permits) required as a result of its improvements to the Premises. Special assessments imposed
by any governmental agency as a result of governmentally required improvements that enhance,
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or purport to enhance, the value of the Premises shall be paid between Landlord and Tenant on
such terms as they may then mutually agree after considering the remaining period of Tenant's
Lease and the useful life of the improvement in question. The reasonable, useful life, for
example, of curb and gutter shall be twenty (20) years.
11.

Right of Entry by Landlord. Landlord and its authorized agents or

representatives shall have the right to enter the Premises at all reasonable times during regular
business hours for any of the following purposes:
(a) To determine whether the Premises are in good condition and whether
Tenant is complying with its obligations under this Lease;
(b) To perform, after reasonable notice to Tenant (unless an emergency, in
which case no notice shall be required), any necessary maintenance including janitorial
services and to make any restoration to the Premises or the building and other
improvements in which the Premises are located that Landlord has the right to perform;
(c) To serve, post, or keep posted any notices required or allowed under
the provisions of this Lease;
(d) To post "for rent" or "for lease" signs during the last sixty (60) days of
the final non renewed term of this Lease, or during any period while Tenant is in default;
and
(e) To show, after reasonable notice to Tenant, the Premise to prospective
brokers, agents, buyers, tenants, or persons with bona-fide interest in an exchange or
purchase of the Premise, at any time during the term of this Lease or any extension
thereof.
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Landlord shall not be liable in any manner for any inconvenience, disturbance,
loss of business, nuisance, or other damage arising out of Landlord's entry on the Premises as
provided in this Paragraph (or any persons brought or permitted onto the Premises by Landlord
or its agents). The above to the contrary notwithstanding, Landlord shall conduct itself during
such inspections in a reasonable businesslike manner and shall be liable for physical injury or
damage resulting from the negligence or acts or omissions of Landlord or its authorized
representatives. Absent an emergency, Landlord shall give forty-eight (48) hours prior notice of
its entry on the Premises, which notice shall be deemed "reasonable" hereunder.
12.

Assignment and Subletting. Neither this Lease nor any interest herein

may be assigned by the Tenant voluntarily or involuntarily by operation of law, and neither all
nor any part of the Premises shall be sublet by the Tenant for a period of longer than 30 days
without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Landlord may withhold its consent on any
basis it, may from time to time, determine. In the event Landlord withhold's consent to sublet
the Premises, Landlord shall be obligated to immediately terminate the Lease with Tenant
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Any such assignment or sublease without Landlord's
prior permission shall be void and unenforceable and shall constitute a default under this Lease.
13.

Damage, Destruction or Condemnation. Should the Premises (or any

portions thereof) be damaged or destroyed, Landlord shall, within fifteen (15) days from the date
of such damage or destruction, either (i) notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to repair
such damage or destruction, in which event Landlord shall promptly repair the same; or (ii)
notify Tenant in writing of Landlord's election to immediately terminate this Lease, in which
event this Lease shall be so terminated effective as of the date of such damage or destruction.
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In the event notice of condemnation by any governmental authority of the
Premises or such part thereof as shall substantially impair the ability of Tenant to conduct its
business, this Lease and the obligations of the parties hereto shall terminate as of the date of
occupancy by such governmental authority. All proceeds and awards of condemnation, whether
received pursuant to agreement between Landlord and any governmental agency or judgment of
any court, shall be exclusively paid to and owned by Landlord, who shall have the sole right to
negotiate and conclude a settlement of the condemnation award or to litigate such award, in
Landlord's sole discretion.
14.

Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold

harmless the Landlord from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from the Tenant's
use of the Premises during the term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all claims against the
Landlord for damages to goods, wares or merchandise or for injury to persons in and upon the
Premises from any cause whatsoever, except such as might result from the negligence of the
Landlord to perform its obligations hereunder within a reasonable time after notice in writing by
the Tenant requiring such performance by the Landlord.
Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Landlord from any and all
claims of any kind or nature arising from (i) any use or occupancy of the Premises, by the Tenant
or an approved sublessee after the Effective Date, (ii) Tenant's performance or failure to perform
as herein provided, (iii) any negligence of Tenant, or any of its agents, contractors, employees,
invitees or licensees, and (iv) for all claims arising from violations of environmental and
hazardous waste statutes (federal, state and local) predicated upon contamination occurring after
the Effective Date and as a result of Tenant's use or misuse of the Premises.
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15.

Comprehensive Public Liability Insurance. Tenant shall at all times

during the term hereof keep in effect with a reputable insurance company qualified to do business
in the state in which the Premises is located, comprehensive public liability insurance in the
names oi and for the benefit of the Tenant and Landlord, as their interests appear, with limits not
less than:
Bodily Injury

$ 500,000 per person
$1,000,000 per occurrence

Property Damage

$ 1,000,000 per occurrence

Such overall insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket coverage
of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days prior to the expiration
of any policy. Each original policy or a certified copy thereof, or a satisfactory certificate of the
insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of payment of premium, shall be deposited with
Landlord within a reasonable time of Landlord's request.
16.

Fire Insurance. Tenant will cause to be maintained fire insurance on the

Premises in an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of the then insurable value, which
insurance shall name Landlord as primary insured. Tenant shall pay all premiums on such fire
insurance on a yearly basis. All such policies shall, to the extent obtainable, provide that any
loss shall be payable to the Landlord or to the holder of any mortgage, as their respective
interests may appear, notwithstanding any act or negligence of the Tenant which might otherwise
result in forfeiture of such insurance. Tenant shall annually give Landlord proof of such
insurance policy being in place, and the policy shall provide that Landlord shall be given at least
thirty (30) days prior notice of termination.
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17.

Surrender of Premise. Tenant agrees to immediately surrender up the

Premise and all of Tenant's improvements and alterations, at the expiration, or sooner
termination, of this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, or as altered pursuant
to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and damage by the elements excepted. Prior
to such termination, Tenant shall remove all signage installed by Tenant, and repair all damages
caused or incurred as a result of such removal.
18.

Quiet Enjoyment. If Tenant performs and observes all the covenants and

provisions hereof, the Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premises, subject, however, to whatever
rights Landlord has, if any, in that portion of the Premises described on Exhibit "B", hereto
19.

Waiver of Covenants or Conditions. No delay or omission in the exercise

of any right or remedy of Landlord on any default by Tenant shall impair such a right or remedy
or be construed as a waiver. No act or conduct of Landlord, including, without limitation, the
acceptance of the keys to the Premises, shall constitute an acceptance of the surrender of the
Premises by Tenant before the expiration of the term. Only a notice from Landlord to Tenant
shall constitute acceptance of the surrender of the Premises and accomplish a termination of the
Lease. Landlord's consent to or approval of any act by Tenant requiring Landlord's consent or
approval shall not be deemed to waive or render unnecessary Landlord's consent to or approval
of any subsequent act by Tenant. Any waiver by Landlord of any default must be in writing and
shall not be a waiver of any default concerning the same or any other provision of the Lease.
20.

Default. If Tenant shall default in the fulfillment of any of the covenants

and conditions hereof, Landlord may, at its option, after fifteen (15) days' prior written notice to
Tenant, make performance for Tenant and for that purpose advance such amounts as may be
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necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense incurred or sum of money paid by
Landlord by reason of the failure of Tenant to comply with any covenant, agreement, obligation
or provisions of this Lease or in defending any action to which Landlord may be subject by
reason of any such failure or any reason of this Lease, shall be deemed to be additional rent for
the Premises and shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand. The receipt by Landlord of
any installment of fixed rent or of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any
other rent then due.
If Tenant shall (i) default in fulfillment of any of the covenants or conditions of
this Lease or (ii) commit a material breach of any other lease or agreement between Landlord
and/or Tenant (other than the covenants for the payment of rent or other amounts) and any such
default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after notice, then Landlord may, at its
option, terminate this Lease by giving Tenant notice of such termination and, thereupon, this
Lease shall expire as fully and completely as if that day were the date definitely fixed for the
expiration of the term of this Lease and Tenant shall immediately quit and surrender the
Premises. If such default cannot be remedied within the period of thirty (30) days by use of
reasonable diligence, then such additional time shall be granted as may be necessary, provided
Tenant takes immediate action on receipt of the notice and proceeds diligently to remedy the
default.
21.

Default in Rent, Cross Default Insolvency of Tenant. If Tenant shall: (i)

abandon or vacate the Premises or any part thereof; (ii) admit in writing its inability to pay its
obligations generally as they become due; or (iii) if the leasehold estate created hereby shall be
taken on execution or by any process of law and not abated, discharged or redeemed by Tenant
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within sixty (60) days; then Landlord may continue this Lease in effect by not terminating
Tenant's right of possession of the Premises, and thereby be entitled to enforce all Landlord's
rights and remedies under this Lease, including the right to recover the rent specified in this
Lease as it becomes due under this Lease; or terminate Tenant's right to possession of the
Premises, thereby terminating this Lease, and bring an action to recover and regain possession of
the Premises in the manner provided by the laws of unlawful detainer then in effect in the state in
which the Premises are located, and recover as damages from Tenant any amount necessary to
compensate Landlord for all damages proximately caused by Tenant's failure to perform its
obligations under this Lease. Landlord shall, in the event it is appropriate, make a commercially
reasonable effort to mitigate Tenant's damages by reletting the Premises on behalf of Tenant.
22.

Holding Over. Tenant shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless

Landlord from and against all claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, resulting
from delay by Tenant in surrendering the Premises in accordance with the provisions of this
Lease. If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises or any part of the Premises after the early
expiration of the Term or sooner termination of this Lease with the consent of Landlord (which
shall be presumed if Tenant remains in possession and Landlord does not notify Tenant in
writing to quit the Premise within fifteen (15) days following expiration of the Term), absent
some other written agreement between the parties, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from
month to month (terminable by either party upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice) at a rental
in the amount provided above, plus all other charges payable under this Lease, and on all of the
terms of this Lease applicable to a month to month tenancy. If Tenant remains in possession of
the Premise or any part of the Premise after the expiration of the Term or sooner termination of
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this Lease, without the consent of the Landlord, Landlord shall, in addition to any other remedies
available to it, haveall of the rights and remedies set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-36-1,
et seq.
23.

Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, covenant and

condition herein contained.
24.

Liens. Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for moneys owing by Tenant

to remain against the Premises for a period of more than thirty (30) days upon actual notice of the
existence of such lien. Should any such lien be filed and not released or discharged within that
time, unless Tenant shall contest the same and provide sufficient surety for the payment thereof,
the same shall constitute a default under the Lease and Landlord may, at Landlord's option (but
without any obligation to do so), pay or discharge such lien and may likewise pay and discharge
any taxes, assessments or other charges against the Premises which Tenant is obligated hereunder
to pay and which may or might become a lien on said Premises. Tenant agrees to repay any such
sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor, together with interest at the rate of eighteen
percent (18%) per annum from the date any such payment is made.
25.

No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for any

purpose, become a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of Tenant's business or
otherwise.
26.

Attorneys' Fees. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of this

Lease by suit or otherwise, whether or not suit is instituted, the prevailing party shall receive its
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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27.

Severability. If any provision of this Lease or the application of any

provision of this Lease to any person or circumstance shall to any extent be invalid, the
remainder of this Lease or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other
than those as to which such provision is held invalid shall not be affected by such invalidity.
Each provision of this Lease shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest exteirt permitted by law.
28.

No Brokerage Commissions. Landlord and Tenant represent and warrant

that no claims exist against them for any brokerage commissions or finder's fees in connection
with this Lease and agree to indemnify, defend and hold the other harmless from and against all
claims, liabilities and expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising from any such brokerage
commissions or finder's fees. Landlord warrants that Landlord has not dealt with any broker in
connection with this Lease.
29.

Rights and Remedies. The rights and remedies of Landlord and Tenant

shall not be mutually exclusive and the exercise of one or mote of the provisions of this Lease
shall not preclude the exercise of any other provisions. The parties confirm that damages at law
may be an inadequate remedy for a breach or threatened breach by any party of any of the
provisions of this Lease. The parties' respective rights and obligations under this Lease shall be
enforceable by specific performance, injunction or any other equitable remedy.
30.

Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be

deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing, by United States mail, postage
prepaid, and addressed as follows:
If to the Landlord at the last known address:
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Ms. Bonita Carter
29 Lone Hollow Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
If to Tenant at the address of the Premises and
Ms. Graciela Italiano-Thomas
Centra de la Familia de Utah
320 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
With a copy to:
Mr. Scott W. Hansen
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main Street, Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
33.

Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements

contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon the parties
hereto and upon their respective successors in interest, assigns and legal representatives, except
as expressly otherwise provided heretofore.
34.

Miscellaneous. The captions to the Paragraphs of this Lease are for

convenience of reference only and shall not be deemed relevant in resolving questions of
construction or interpretation under this Lease. Tenant shall aet be allowed to record a
memorandum or notice of this Lease without the prior written consent of Landlord. Each
provision to be performed by Tenant shall be construed to be both a covenant and a condition.
This Lease shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah. This Agreement replaces all prior agreements of the parties hereto as to the rental
of the Premises by Tenant.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto caused these presents to be executed
the day and year first above written.
LANDLORD:
Dream Chaser, LLC

Its Manager
TENANT:
Centro de la Familia de Utah

By:
Its:

•v
Gradelaltaliano-Thomas
Chief Executive Officer

327191
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